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A Failed Experiment: Conversion
Therapy as Child Abuse
Cory W. Lee

“[T]his case presents a conflict between one of society’s most
cherished rights—freedom of expression—and one of the government’s most profound obligations—the protection of minors.”1
INTRODUCTION

Sexual orientation conversion therapy is the use of counseling
and psychotherapy in an attempt to abolish an individual’s attraction to members of the same sex.2 In this practice, licensed therapists promote heterosexuality as the desired outcome under the
false pretense that there is a need to intervene to change the patient’s core identity because homosexuality and diverse gender
identities are inherently pathological.3 Merriam-Webster defines
“pathological” as “altered or caused by disease; being such to a degree that is extreme, excessive, or markedly abnormal.”4 Therefore,
therapists who use conversion therapy inherently believe their

1. Am. Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1495 (11th Cir. 1990).
2. Just the Facts Coal., Just the Facts About Sexual Orientation and
Youth: A Primer for Principals, Educators, and School Personnel, AM. PSYCHOL.
ASS’N (2008), https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/just-the-facts.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X2FY-4DU3].
3. Conversion Therapy, AM. ACAD. OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY
(Feb. 2018), https://www.aacap.org/AACAP/Policy_Statements/2018/
Conversion_Therapy.aspx [https://perma.cc/3RT4-AWPU].
4. Pathological, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/pathological [https://perma.cc/3XXL-QSD5] (last visited Aug. 20,
2021).
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homosexual patients possess a disease that can only be cured by
participating in Sexual Orientation Change Efforts (SOCE).5
However, in 1973, the American Psychological Association
(APA) declassified homosexuality as a pathology from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).6 The APA
explained its decision by stating, “The idea that homosexuality is a
mental disorder or that the emergence of same-sex attraction and
orientation among some adolescents is in any way abnormal or
mentally unhealthy has no support among any mainstream health
and mental health professional organizations.”7 Further, the APA
suggests that even in the absence of scientific evidence to support
SOCE, conversion therapy practices have been adopted and promoted by some political and religious organizations, which indicates that sexual orientation is not considered a mental disorder
but a moral one.8
Organizations such as Focus on the Family and Americans for
Truth About Homosexuality have used morality as a defense for
subjecting minors to conversion therapy.9 For example, in its 2018
statement, Focus on the Family wrote:
Professional therapy for same-sex attraction and sexual
identity has recently generated question and concern . . .
[a]t stake are religious freedoms sacred to families and
American life, client autonomy, individual well-being, and
parental rights . . . We believe in and support the availability of professional counseling in matters of sexuality that is
respectful, safe, ethical, and responsive to the client’s values and desires.10
This statement illustrates that SOCE should be supported so long
as professional therapy for same-sex attraction is used to protect

5. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, supra note 3.
6. Just the Facts Coal., supra note 2 at 5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Counseling for Sexual Identity Concerns: A measured, careful, and
compassionate approach, FOCUS ON THE FAM. (Nov. 2, 2018), http://media.focusonthefamily.com/topicinfo/counseling-for-sexual-identity-concerns.pdf
[https://perma.cc/69X6-6REZ].
10. Id.
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parental rights, religious freedoms, and the patient’s health.11
This Comment will explore fundamental parental rights and
First Amendment arguments as a means to establish conversion
therapy as child abuse. Section II will discuss how SOCE relates to
fundamental parental rights, Section III will discuss challenges facing the First Amendment, including freedom of speech and freedom
of religion, and Section IV will explore child abuse statutes and establish SOCE as child abuse.
I.

SEXUAL ORIENTATION CHANGE EFFORTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
PARENTAL RIGHTS

The Supreme Court has long recognized the relationship between the parent and child is constitutionally protected.12 Additionally, the Court has stated that a parent’s fundamental right to
raise their children is beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.13 Further, the Court has repeatedly recognized parents
have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children.14 This indicates that parents
have broad authority over minor children.15
This authority extends into medical treatment for minor children.16 Further, simply because a parent’s medical decision is not
the child’s preferred method or because it involves risk does not automatically transfer power to make a medical decision from parents
to the State.17 However, while governmental power may not supersede parental authority in all cases solely because some parents
abuse or neglect children, the State is not without constitutional
authority over parental discretion when a child’s mental and physical health is jeopardized.18 Parents have no more of an unlimited
right to inflict corporal punishment on their children under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments than they do under the First

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See id.
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
See id. at 602–04.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 603.
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Amendment,19 and a state has a compelling interest in protecting
children from harmful medical treatments and has broad authority
to do so.20
There are only two cases thus far that have raised the question
of fundamental parental rights regarding SOCE, and this Section
will analyze how courts have prohibited SOCE while reconciling
fundamental parental rights.
A. California
California passed a bill that prohibited licensed mental health
professionals from practicing SOCE on minor patients.21 In Pickup
v. Brown, Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the new law,
arguing their fundamental parental rights were violated.22 In their
argument, Plaintiffs asserted their right to make important medical decisions regarding their children.23 While recognizing this fundamental right, the court disagreed with Plaintiffs, writing, “Parents have a constitutionally protected right to make decisions
regarding the care, custody, and control of their children, but that
right is ‘not without limitations.’”24 The court then analyzed other
situations in which the State may impede on parental rights, including when a parent refuses necessary medical care for a child.25
Further, the court took notice that the State is not without constitutional control over parental discretion when a child’s physical or
mental health is jeopardized.26
Additionally, because there has yet to be a decision that specifically addresses whether a parent’s fundamental rights encompass
the right to choose for a child a particular type of provider for a
particular treatment that the state has deemed harmful, the court
looked to whether the parents have the right to choose specific
19. Doe v. Christie, 33 F.Supp.3d 518, 529 (D.N.J. 2014) (quoting Sweaney
v. Ada Cnty., 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)).
20. Id. (citing Croft v. Westmoreland Co. Children and Youth Serv., 103
F.3d 1123, 1125 (3rd Cir. 1997)).
21. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221, 1222–23 (9th Cir. 2014).
22. Id. at 1225.
23. Id. at 1235.
24. Id. (citing Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir.
2005)).
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979)).
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treatments for themselves.27 The court essentially concluded parents did not possess that right.28 In making this decision, the court
looked to other circuits’ decisions regarding similar issues and
found “a patient does not have a constitutional right to obtain a
particular type of treatment or to obtain treatment from a particular provider if the government has reasonably prohibited that type
of treatment or provider.”29 The court used this reasoning to undercut Plaintiffs’ substantive due process argument and found parents do not have a fundamental right to utilize a specific medical or
mental health treatment the State has deemed harmful.30
B. New Jersey
New Jersey also implemented a law that prohibited SOCE because the State determined the medical treatment harmful to minors.31 In Doe v. Christie, Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of this law, arguing the law infringed upon Plaintiffs’
constitutional right to care for their child and direct his upbringing.32 Specifically, Plaintiffs argued the law deprived them of their
constitutionally-protected authority to select medical procedures
and to otherwise decide what is best for their son without interference from the government.33 In response, Defendant argued that
while Plaintiffs possessed the fundamental right to parent their
child as they saw fit, they do not have the right to select medical
treatment for their minor child that the state has deemed harmful.34
The Doe court mentioned Plaintiffs provided no case law or any
other authority to support their position that Plaintiffs’ fundamental parental rights encompass the right to choose a specific medical
treatment for their son.35 However, the Court recognized the Third

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1993)).
Id.
Doe v. Christie, 33 F. Supp. 3d 518, 521 (D.N.J. 2014).
Id. at 529.
Id. at 528.
Id.
Id. at 529.
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Circuit had not ruled on this issue, so the Court looked to other circuits for guidance.36
The Ninth Circuit concluded that “the fundamental rights of
parents do not include the right to choose a specific type of provider
for a specific medical or mental health treatment that the state has
reasonably deemed harmful.”37 The Ninth Circuit also held that
“substantive due process rights do not extend to the choice of type
of treatment or of a particular health care provider” and that “there
is not a fundamental right to choose a mental health professional
with specific training.”38 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit held
“[A] patient does not have a constitutional right to obtain a particular type of treatment or to obtain treatment from a particular provider if the government has reasonably prohibited that type of
treatment or provider.”39 Finally, the Tenth Circuit held “[T]he decision by the patient whether to have a treatment or not is not a
protected right, but his selection of a particular treatment, or at
least a medication, is within the area of governmental interest in
protecting public health.”40
The Doe court found these decisions persuasive and rejected
the Plaintiff parents’ argument that they were denied their fundamental parental right because the ultimate medical treatment—
SOCE—had been deemed harmful and ineffective by the state of
New Jersey.41
While the Ninth and Third Circuits are currently the only
courts that have ruled on this constitutional issue, more courts have
analyzed other constitutional arguments regarding SOCE.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENTS

“Speech,” as protected by the First Amendment, extends to
many activities that are by their very nature nonverbal, “[b]ut
36. Id. at 529–30.
37. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1236 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis
added).
38. Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Bd. Of
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2000).
39. Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasis
added).
40. Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
41. Doe, 33 F.Supp.3d at 530.
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whatever its source, there must be some outward manifestation of
the allegedly protected First Amendment activity.”42 While the
First Amendment protects commercial speech, it does not protect
misleading commercial speech.43 Additionally, this protection does
not extend to commercial speech about unlawful activity.44 Therefore, a law may burden speech protected by the First Amendment
even when it does so indirectly.45
Additionally, the right to free exercise of religion is not absolute, in that conduct remains subject to regulation for society’s protection.46 However, for a regulation to not conflict with the First
Amendment, the regulation must have a secular purpose, the principal effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
and it must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.47 Therefore, when a statute possesses the predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates the central First Amendment
value of official religious neutrality.48
This Section will explore the various First Amendment arguments regarding SOCE and how courts have responded to such
claims.
A. Freedom of Speech
Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.49
Congress is allowed, however, to restrict speech when the speech
incites illegal activity, consists of fighting words, or contains obscenity.50 The theory behind these restrictions is that social order
and society’s moral values outweigh First Amendment protections,
which begs the question: should SOCE be considered speech that is
afforded First Amendment protection?

42. Jordan v. Ector County, 516 F.3d 290, 296 (5th Cir. 2008).
43. Fanning v. FTC, 821 F.3d 164, 175 (1st Cir. 2016).
44. United States v. Bell, 238 F.Supp.2d 696, 704 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
45. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
46. Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
47. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
48. McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
50. Phelphs-Roper v. Koster, 713 F.3d 942, 948 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002) (en
banc)).
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Sexual Orientation Change Efforts as Professional Speech

Courts are split on whether SOCE therapy should be considered professional speech or conduct.51 In Pickup v. Brown, the
Ninth Circuit categorized California’s law prohibiting SOCE as regulating conduct and concluded that the law should be analyzed
through rational basis review.52 Contrastly, in King v. Governor of
the State of New Jersey, the Third Circuit established SOCE as professional speech that does not trigger strict scrutiny based on content and viewpoint.53 However, in National Institute of Family and
Life Advocates v. Becerra, the Supreme Court held that professional
speech is not a separate category of speech exempt from the rule
that content-based regulations of speech are subject to strict scrutiny.54
If one were to argue that SOCE should be classified as speech
because speech is the only tool therapists use in SOCE treatment,
the court will likely apply strict scrutiny review. While laws prohibiting SOCE are prohibiting treatment, it is the therapists’ words
that are the tool for the treatment.55 Further, restrictions on SOCE
would also be considered content-based restrictions because these
restrictions target specifically SOCE speech based on communicative content: the therapists’ words to the patient intended to change
the patient’s sexual orientation.56 However, content-based laws are
presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that the laws in question are narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest.57 Finally, if the laws prohibiting SOCE are content-based, an analysis of whether the laws
are viewpoint discriminatory is required.58

51. Compare Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1234 (9th Cir. 2014) with
King v. Governor of New Jersey, 757 F.3d 216, 237 (3rd Cir. 2014).
52. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1234.
53. King, 757 F.3d at 237.
54. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advoc. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371
(2018).
55. See King, 757 F.3d at 221.
56. But see Mason D. Bracken, Torture is Not Protected Speech: Free
Speech Analysis of Bans on Gay Conversion Therapy, 63 WASH. UNIV. J.L. &
POL’Y 325, 347–48 (2020).
57. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).
58. Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 353 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1252 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
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Viewpoint discrimination occurs when the government favors “one
speaker over another” and when speech is prohibited “because of its
message.”59 Therefore, the government may not target “particular
views taken by speakers on a subject.”60 However, “[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable [sic], no significant danger of viewpoint discrimination exists.”61
To apply strict scrutiny review to laws prohibiting SOCE, one
must establish that the law was passed to further a compelling governmental interest, and the law restricting a professional’s speech
is narrowly tailored to serve that government interest.62 A number
of states have passed laws banning SOCE that would be subjected
to strict scrutiny review.63 For example, in 2019, the New York
legislature passed a law that prohibited SOCE on minors, and the
legislature deemed it professional misconduct for a mental health
professional to engage in SOCE.64 New York arguably has a compelling interest in protecting its minors’ physical and psychological
health from dangerous psychological practices, and a law that heavily relies on information provided by major professional associations of mental health practitioners and researchers to establish
SOCE as dangerous should be considered narrowly tailored to serve
this interest because the law is narrowly tailored to attack that one
particular harmful practice.65 Therefore, it is likely this law would
pass strict scrutiny review, and the ban on SOCE in New York
would likely be upheld.
Similarly, in 2013, New Jersey passed a law that banned
SOCE.66 Much like in New York, the New Jersey legislature included statistics in its findings that reinforced New Jersey’s interest in protecting minors from SOCE.67 Here, New Jersey stated:

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
Id. at 829.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
E.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6531-a (McKinney 2019).
Id.
But see Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-54(n) (West 2013).
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-54(m) (West 2013).
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Minors who experience family rejection based on their sexual orientation face especially serious health risks. In one
study, lesbian, gay, and bisexual young adults who reported higher levels of family rejection during adolescence
were 8.4 times more likely to report having attempted suicide, 5.9 times more likely to report high levels of depression, 3.4 times more likely to use illegal drugs, and 3.4
times more likely to report having engaged in unprotected
sexual intercourse compared with peers from families that
reported no or low levels of family rejection.68
If New Jersey’s interest to protect minors is compelling, and its laws
prohibiting SOCE are narrowly tailored—much like New York’s—
it is likely that a court will deem New Jersey’s prohibition constitutional. If these laws prohibiting SOCE pass strict scrutiny, an analysis of whether the SOCE laws are viewpoint discrimination is required.69
Without determining whether the laws prohibiting SOCE fell
under strict or intermediate scrutiny, the Otto court thoroughly discussed viewpoint discrimination.70 Here, Plaintiffs argued the ordinances discriminated against the viewpoint of those “who wish to
reduce or eliminate behaviors, identity, or expressions that differ
from their biological sex.”71 Further, Plaintiffs argued the exclusion of counseling that “provides support and assistance to a person
undergoing gender transition” from the definition of conversion
therapy demonstrated that the ordinances were viewpoint discriminatory.72 However, the court disagreed. Rather, the court stated:
The ordinances do not regulate Plaintiffs’ view about
SOCE, homosexuality, or human attraction more generally. The ordinances also do not indicate a preference between heterosexual or homosexual individuals seeking to
change their sexual orientation one way or another . . . The
ordinances do regulate the practices of licensed medical

68. Id.
69. See Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1113–14; Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 353
F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
70. See generally Otto, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1268–70.
71. Id. at 1268.
72. Id.
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providers in trying to change a child’s sexual orientation.
This practice is what is regulated, not any particular viewpoint on the subject . . . The ordinances do not ban change,
or the expression of the viewpoint that change in sexual
orientation is possible. The ordinances do ban efforts,
through a medical intervention, by a licensed provider, to
therapeutically change a minor’s sexual orientation. Presented with a minor client seeking to change his or her sexual orientation or gender identity, Plaintiffs may commend
and recommend conversion therapy. Plaintiffs cannot perform SOCE in Palm Beach County or City Boca Raton.73
Because the court found the alleged viewpoint discrimination
against those who believe that it is possible to change a person’s
sexual orientation through SOCE was not distinguishable from the
subject matter being regulated, the ordinances were not per se unconstitutional.74 “When the basis for the content discrimination
consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue
is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists.”75
However, even if a court finds that the law prohibiting SOCE
fails strict scrutiny review, there is another category of speech that
may allow states to ban SOCE within its borders: commercial
speech.76
2.

Sexual Orientation Change Efforts as Commercial Speech

Commercial speech is speech that proposes a commercial transaction.77 Additionally, commercial speech is an “expression related
solely to the economic interest of the speaker and its audience.”78
However, advertising which “links a product to a current public debate” is not entitled to the constitutional protection afforded

73. Id. at 1269.
74. Id. at 1270.
75. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
76. See Otto, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1253–54.
77. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 776 (1976).
78. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elect. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980) (quoting Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
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noncommercial speech.79 While the Supreme Court in Valentine v.
Chrestensen held that commercial speech was not protected by the
First Amendment80, the Court in Bigelow v. Virginia stated “speech
is not stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it appears” as commercial advertisement.81 Further, the Court said
that “[t]he fact that the particular advertisement in appellant’s
newspaper had commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser’s
commercial interests did not negate all First Amendment guarantees.”82 One year following this decision, the Court clearly established in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc. that commercial speech was protected by
the First Amendment, and Valentine v. Christensen was no longer
valid law.83
While the Otto court determined that SOCE did not fall under
the commercial speech category, it is important to look at how
SOCE can fall under commercial speech. SOCE advertising could
be considered commercial speech as SOCE finds itself within the
stream of commerce through the exchange of money for psychotherapy services, and SOCE advertising could be subjected to the same
commercial scrutiny as any other service or product.84 If a court
determines SOCE can fall under commercial speech, the test used
to determine whether a law violates the First Amendment protections for commercial speech comes from Central Hudson, and the
test appears to be nearly identical to intermediate scrutiny review.85 In Central Hudson, the Court determined the test for commercial speech is: (1) Is the speech lawful and not deceptive that
would allow First Amendment protections? (2) Does the

79. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (quoting
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 563 n.5).
80. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“[w]e are equally
clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”).
81. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975).
82. Id.
83. Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761–62 (“[i]t is clear, for example, that speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money
is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another.”).
84. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S.
557, 563 (1980).
85. Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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government have a substantial interest? (3) Does the law directly
advance the government’s interest? (4) Is the regulation of speech
no more extensive than necessary to achieve the government’s interest?86
For laws that prohibit SOCE, the first prong would immediately be in question. One could argue that SOCE are deceptive in
that there is no scientific evidence to suggest SOCE is successful.
Rather, there is a remarkable amount of scientific data from the
American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the American Psychological Association Council of Representatives, the Pan American Health Organization (an office of the World Health
Organization), the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry’s Practice Parameter, the American School Counselor Association, and the United States Department of Health and Human
Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration that indicates minor children who are subjected to SOCE
face a number of subsequent problems including distress, substance
abuse, depression, and suicidality.87 In light of the data cutting
against SOCE advocates and practitioners, it would be difficult to
overcome the presumption that SOCE deceives minor patients and
their families in believing sexual orientation can be altered.88 Because the “government may ban forms of communication more
likely to deceive the public than to inform it,”89 states like New York
and New Jersey are justified in prohibiting SOCE within their borders simply on commercial speech purposes.
While the second and third prongs were fulfilled by the analysis in Part III, the fourth prong remains to be the last obstacle that
could determine SOCE would not be protected by the First Amendment. To determine whether the government interest could be
served by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, it is important to discuss the language of one of the statutes. In its statute,
New York specifically prohibits medical health professionals from
86. Id. at 566.
87. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Florida 353 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1258–60
(S.D. Fla. 2019).
88. See id. at 1261–62, 1266 (holding that the City of Boca Raton was “entitled to conclude that an informed consent protocol would not adequately protect minors from this harm.”).
89. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 563.
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practicing SOCE on minor children.90 The law is neither overinclusive or underinclusive, and its sole purpose is to protect minor children from a practice that has yet to be proven effective within the
medical community.91 The law does not prohibit SOCE on adult
patients, which one could infer that if a mental health professional
wished to perform SOCE on a consenting, adult patient, he could do
so. New York’s sole interest is to protect children from a practice
that has yet to yield any scientific or professional support when evidence to the contrary is overwhelming. Therefore, New York’s law
that prohibits SOCE is no more extensive than necessary to achieve
the government’s interest. While SOCE may not be classified as
protected speech, it may, however, still be protected under freedom
of religion.
B. Freedom of Religion
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.92 “The right to freely
exercise one’s religion, however, ‘does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a “valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”’”93 A neutral,
generally applicable law does not offend the Free Exercise Clause,
even if the law has an incidental effect on religious practice.94 However, a law lacks neutrality if it “targets religious beliefs” or if its
“object . . . is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivations.”95
1. Sexual Orientation Change Efforts and the Free Exercise
Clause
The free exercise of religion “means . . . the right to believe and

90. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6531-a(2) (McKinney 2019).
91. A.B. 576 ch. 7 § 1(k), 242d Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
93. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)).
94. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79.
95. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 533 (1993).
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profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”96 Therefore, the
First Amendment protects “government regulation of religious beliefs as such.”97 The government cannot compel its citizens to affirm a specific religious belief,98 punish a specific religious belief it
believes is false,99 or use its power to favor one religious authority
over another.100 Additionally, the exercise of religion often includes
physical acts such as joining others in a worship service, refraining
from certain foods, and participating in holy sacraments.101 Further, a State that prohibits acts only when they are engaged in for
religious reasons or because of the religious belief they display
would most certainly be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”102 Courts have held that prohibiting SOCE does not in fact
violate the Free Exercise Clause.
In 2018, Maryland passed a law that prohibited mental health
practitioners from engaging in SOCE.103 In Doyle v. Hogan, the
plaintiff, a professional counselor, challenged this law on the basis
that it targeted his “sincerely held religious beliefs regarding human nature, gender, ethics, morality, and counseling to eliminate,
reduce, or resolve unwanted same-sex attractions, behaviors, or
identity” by prohibiting him from “offering . . . counseling that is
consistent with [those] religious beliefs.”104 The court, however,
disagreed.105 Rather, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland found that the First Amendment does not provide an absolute protection to engage in religiously motivated conduct.106 The
court reasoned that even in circumstances when a neutral,

96. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
97. Id. (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)).
98. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
99. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–88 (1944).
100. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696, 708–09 (1976); Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119–21
(1952).
101. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
102. Id.
103. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 1-212.1 (West 2018).
104. Doyle v. Hogan, 411 F. Supp. 3d 337, 348 (D. Md. 2019), vacated, 1
F.4th 249 (4th Cit. 2021).
105. Id. at 349.
106. Id.
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generally applicable law has an incidental effect on religious practices, that law does not offend the Free Exercise Clause.107 The
court also noted that because the statute is facially neutral, it is
“silent as to religion or religious practice,” and the plaintiff failed to
provide facts showing Maryland’s law was designed to “burden
practices because of their religious motivation.”108 Therefore, the
court determined the law did not violate the plaintiff’s free exercise
rights.109
The right to freely exercise one’s religion was infringed again
in King v. Governor of New Jersey.110 Here, the Third Circuit stated
that if the law prohibiting SOCE is “neutral” and “generally applicable,” it will withstand a free exercise challenge so long as it is
“rationally related to a legitimate government objective.”111 The
court noted that the law made no explicit reference to any religion
or religious beliefs and was thus facially neutral.112 While the
plaintiffs contended that the law operates as an “impermissible religious gerrymander” because it provides specific exemptions for
counseling, the court held that none of the five exemptions targeted
religiously motivated conduct, and the law would survive the rational basis test.113 The court went on to state that the law did not
give preferential treatment to homosexuals because the statute prohibited all sexual orientation change efforts regardless of the direction of the desired change.114 Therefore, the King court held the
law prohibiting SOCE did not violate the plaintiffs’ free exercise
rights and was constitutional.115
In Doe v. Christie, the plaintiffs challenged the same statute
found in King on similar grounds. Here, the court used identical
reasoning from King to find that the statute was constitutional.116

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 241 (3d Cir.
2014).
111. Id. at 242 (quoting Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 284 (3d
Cir. 2009)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 242–43.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 243.
116. Doe v. Christie, 33 F. Supp. 3d 518, 527 (D.N.J. 2014).
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The court noted the only difference between King and Doe was that
the Doe plaintiffs challenged the statute because they were unable
to receive SOCE, whereas in King, the therapist-plaintiffs based
their Free Exercise arguments on the prohibition of providing
SOCE.117 Despite the distinction, the court found the statute was
constitutional and did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because
the statute was facially neutral with respect to religion and was
generally applicable.118
Here, this law does not restrict one’s ability to practice religious
sacraments; it merely restricts mental health professionals from
engaging in conduct—the mental health treatment—that the State
has deemed ineffective and harmful to minors.119 Further, the restriction is in contemplation of any sexuality on the LGBTQ+ spectrum, not just the ones that traditional religious groups have
sought to cure.120 The law does not discriminate on whether someone wishes to change from homosexual to heterosexual, bisexual to
heterosexual, or even heterosexual to homosexual.121 Rather, the
law prohibits medical treatment that has been deemed harmful by
a number of professional organizations, and advocates for SOCE
have yet to provide sufficient evidence to support the notion that
SOCE is beneficial to—or even successful on—minors. Therefore,
it is unlikely a court will hold laws prohibiting SOCE violate the
Free Exercise Clause.
There is one more argument pertaining to the First Amendment, and there is currently only one case that addresses whether
prohibiting SOCE violates the Establishment Clause.
2. Sexual Orientation Change Efforts and the Establishment
Clause
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.122 “This clause applies not only to official condonement of a
particular religion or religious belief, but also to official disapproval

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 527–28.
Id. at 527.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55(a) (West 2013).
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-54(a) (West 2013).
§ 45:1-55(a).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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or hostility towards religion.”123 A statute will survive an Establishment Clause attack if: (1) it has a secular legislative purpose;
(2) its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3)
it does not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.124 While the Lemon test is most used in cases involving the
government giving preferential treatment to one religion over another, the Lemon test may also serve to analyze a claim of hostility
toward religion as well.125
In Welch v. Brown, Plaintiffs solely relied on the third prong of
the Lemon test to argue that by prohibiting SOCE, California had
excessively entangled itself with religion.126 In determining
whether the government has excessively entangled itself with religion, the court must analyze “the character and purpose of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State
provides, and the resulting relationships between the government
and the religious activity.”127 A relationship results in an excessive
entanglement with religion “if it requires ‘sustained and detailed’
interaction between church and State ‘for enforcement of statutory
or administrative standards.’”128 The Welch court examined how
the law prohibiting SOCE would entangle the government with religious activity.129
The court began by recognizing the SOCE prohibition would
neither contemplate or require an examination of religious views or
doctrine because the law does not provide a motive or justification
for providing SOCE.130 The court provides support by stating, “the
law simply categorically prohibits a mental health provider from
providing that type of therapeutic treatment to a minor.”131 Here,
the state does not need to interpret religious texts or doctrines regarding homosexuality or one’s ability to change their sexual
123. Am. Fam. Ass’n, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114,
1120–21 (9th Cir. 2002).
124. Williams v. California, 764 F.3d 1002, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)).
125. Am. Fam. Ass’n, Inc., 277 F.3d at 1121.
126. Welch v. Brown, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1089 (E.D. Cal. 2014).
127. Williams, 764 F.3d at 1015 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615).
128. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621.
129. Welch, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1089.
130. Id. at 1089–90.
131. Id. at 1089.
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orientation.132 The court enhanced its holding by stating, “the inquiry into whether a mental health provider performed SOCE will
be the same regardless of whether the provider utilized the treatment while working for a church. [The law] will thus not require
the state to engage in “intrusive judgments regarding contested
questions of religious belief or practice.”133
Additionally, the court looked to whether upholding the SOCE
prohibition would present a “significant risk” that the Establishment Clause would be infringed.134 The court found that even if a
mental health provider’s use of SOCE relied on church doctrines or
teachings, the state would not need to interpret those teachings to
find the provider had performed SOCE.135 Further, the court
stated the substantial risk argument also fails because the government does not need to oversee a church, its teachings, or counseling
to enforce the prohibition of SOCE, which only weakens the contention that excessive entanglement is present.136 Therefore, the government did not risk becoming excessively entangled with religion
when it prohibited SOCE.
While the Welch court remains to be the only court thus far that
has addressed the Establishment Clause issue, this holding—along
with the aforementioned holdings in this Comment—continues to
fail LGBTQ+ people across the country because these holdings do
not offer blanket protections.
Without blanket protections,
LGBTQ+ youth will not be completely safe under the law. The
APA—along with several other professional mental health organizations—has deemed SOCE ineffective and harmful to minors,
which now raises the question: if a parent or guardian subjects a
minor child to SOCE, can that constitute child abuse?
III. CHILD ABUSE

“A parent’s constitutionally protected right to direct the child’s
upbringing, which includes authority to consent to necessary, ordinary, surgical, complementary and alternative, and elective
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133.
134.
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136.

Id. at 1089–90.
Id. at 1090.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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medical care.”137 However, a parent does not have authority to consent to medical procedures or treatments that provide no health
benefit to the child and pose a substantial risk of serious harm to the
child’s physical or mental health.138 Further, a parent’s broad authority to make medical decisions on behalf of their minor child is
“limited by the duty to provide medical care that is necessary to
prevent serious harm or a substantial risk of serious harm to the
child’s physical or mental health.”139 Examples of serious harm include fractures, internal injuries, second or third degree burns, severe anxiety, depression, and diagnosable mood or thought disorders
that substantially impair judgment.140
This Section will explore how states have defined child abuse
as a way to establish SOCE as child abuse.
A. How States Define Child Abuse
The Office on Child Abuse and Neglect has defined “child abuse
and neglect” as “any recent act or failure to act on the part of a
parent or caretaker, which results in death, serious physical or
emotional harm.”141 California defines “child abuse or neglect” to
include “the willful harming or injuring of a child or the endangering of the person or health of a child.”142 Further, California defines
“willful harming or endangering of a child” as “a situation in which
any person willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts
thereon, unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having
the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of the child to be placed in a situation in which his or
her person or health is endangered.”143 Similarly, New Jersey defines “child abuse” as “employing or permitting a child to be employed in any vocation or employment injurious to its health or dangerous to its life or limb.”144 Finally, New York defines “neglected

137. RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN & THE LAW § 2.30 (AM. L. INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2018).
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 5101.
142. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.6 (West 2008).
143. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.3 (West 2008).
144. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1 (West 1987).
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child” as “a child less than eighteen years of age whose physical,
mental, or emotional condition has been impaired.”145
B. Sexual Orientation Change Efforts as Child Abuse
SOCE advocates will likely claim their First Amendment and
fundamental parental rights will be violated; however, as noted in
Sections II and III, restrictions on both fundamental parental
rights and the First Amendment may be constitutional.146 Even in
prohibiting SOCE beyond the scope of mental health professionals
to include religious institutions, the restriction could pass strict
scrutiny review. Strict scrutiny review is appropriate here because
courts are split on which standard of review to apply; therefore, it
is plausible that the best course of action is to apply the strictest
standard.147
Under strict scrutiny review, the law in question must further
a compelling governmental interest that is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.148 Here, states such as California, New Jersey, and New York have a compelling interest in protecting minors
from ineffective, harmful medical treatments, especially when
there is no evidence to suggest a specific medical treatment is effective and safe.149 Additionally, states have a compelling interest in
promoting and regulating medical treatments that are based on
sound, rational, peer-approved scientific research.
The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
has stated that “there is no evidence that sexual orientation can be
altered through therapy, and that attempts to do so may be harmful.”150 The APA further added that “cures” from SOCE are counterbalanced by anecdotal accounts of psychological harm, which
may result in exacerbating other risks like depression, anxiety and
self-destructive behavior, “since therapist alignment with societal
prejudices against homosexuality may reinforce self-hatred already
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experienced by the patient.”151 Minors who experience rejection
based on their sexuality are far more likely to suffer from depression, use illegal drugs, and commit suicide.152 Any state that is
willing to protect minor children from these repercussions would
have a compelling interest to do so.153 Additionally, the law is narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s interest in protecting
minors from SOCE.154 California, New York, and New Jersey all
have passed their SOCE laws on the basis of protecting minor children from this medical practice, and these SOCE restrictions do not
go beyond serving that interest because the restrictions are only on
SOCE.155 Now that it is established SOCE laws may pass strict
scrutiny review, below is an analysis of whether SOCE practice itself can be deemed as child abuse.
If SOCE restrictions are upheld, practicing SOCE could be construed as child abuse statutes since the same science that supports
the prohibition on SOCE supports the notion that SOCE causes distress, substance abuse, depression, and a high risk of suicide.156 By
doing so, parents, therapists, and religious leaders would be subjecting a child to a medical treatment that poses substantial risks
to the child’s mental health. For example, in its 2013 press release,
the APA mentions fourteen states as well as the District of Columbia have banned SOCE, and the APA goes a step further and “calls
upon other lawmakers to ban the harmful and discriminatory practice.”157 What makes SOCE so harmful to minors is the social

151. § 45:1-54(d)(1)-(2).
152. § 45:1-54(m).
153. See § 45:1-54(m).
154. See Bracken, supra note 56, at 352–53. But see Otto v. City of Boca
Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 869 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Strict scrutiny cannot be satisfied
by professional societies’ opposition to speech. Although we have no reason to
doubt that these groups are composed of educated men and women acting in
good faith, their institutional positions cannot define the boundaries of constitutional rights. They may hit the right mark—but they may also miss it.”) (emphasis added).
155. Bracken, supra note 56, at 353.
156. See § 45:1-54(m).
157. APA Reiterates Strong Opposition to Conversion Therapy, AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.psychiatry.org/newsroom/news-releases/apa-reiterates-strong-opposition-to-conversion-therapy
[perma.cc/G3ZH-KQ9R].
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rejection they encounter because SOCE itself is rooted in discrimination.158
In an attempt to understand why LGBTQ+ people were facing
higher rates of depression and suicide, the American Journal of
Public Health published a study that indicates discrimination may
be the cause of mental health issues.159 Although the study did not
necessarily prove that discrimination caused mental health problems, the study found strong evidence of a relationship between discrimination and anxiety, depression, and other stress-related mental health problems.160 Further, another study published in
Pediatrics suggests that LGBT youth who face parental rejection
were 8.4 times more likely to report having attempted suicide and
5.9 times more likely to report high levels of depression than LGB
peers who reported no or low levels of family rejection.161 In support of their research, the authors wrote, “Because families play
such a critical role in child and adolescent development, it is not
surprising that adverse, punitive, and traumatic reactions from
parents and caregivers would have such a negative influence on
[young people’s] risk behaviors and health status as young
adults.”162 And finally, another study published in Annual Review
of Clinical Psychology suggests that positive parental and familial
relationships are crucial for youth well-being, and those who experience family repudiation are those at the greatest risk for depressive symptoms, anxiety, and suicide attempts.163
All three studies indicate that rejection and discrimination are
prominent factors in decreasing mental health in LGBTQ+

158. § 45:1-54(j)(1).
159. Tori DeAngelis, New data on lesbian, gay and bisexual mental health,
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160. Id.
161. See Tori DeAngelis, Parents’ rejection of a child’s sexual orientation
fuels mental health problems, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/03/orientation [https://perma.cc/9BZA-7RVT] (last visited Jul. 10,
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youth.164 While these studies are merely examples of the insurmountable evidence that indicate SOCE is harmful and ineffective,
these studies shed light on the substantial risk SOCE poses on a
minor’s mental health.165 The medical consensus today suggests
that subjecting a child to SOCE simply because the parent or religious leader believes the child’s sexual orientation is wrong can lead
to substantial mental health concerns.166 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, SOCE most certainly falls under the definition of child abuse and should be considered as such.
CONCLUSION

In sum, courts across the country are in agreement that when
a state decides to prohibit a medical practice it has determined as
harmful and ineffective, that prohibition does not violate fundamental parental rights, nor does it violate one’s freedom of speech
or freedom of religion.167 As explained above, state legislatures
that have decided to prohibit SOCE have not violated a parent’s
right to raise their child as they wish.168 Rather, the state may step
in to prevent harmful medical professionals from conducting harmful medical treatments within its borders. Additionally, state legislatures may restrict one’s freedom to speak or one’s freedom to
exercise religion if that freedom violates another’s freedom to exist
without harm, and that restriction has repeatedly been considered
facially neutral and surpasses the strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, any parent, religious leader, or medical professional who continues to use SOCE while knowing where the medical community
stands on this medical treatment has willfully placed the health of
the child in a situation in which his or her person or health is endangered. That decision alone is enough to establish child abuse
and neglect under various state law.

164. Id.; DeAngelis, supra note 159; DeAngelis, supra note 161.
165. Cf. Bracken, supra note 56, at 336–37 (stating that efforts to change
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harm).
166. See Russell & Fish, supra note 163, at 7.
167. E.g., Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1235–36 (9th Cir. 2014).
168. See id. at 1236.
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While current SOCE restrictions are an incredible starting
point, they do not extend far enough. LGBTQ+ youth continue to
be subjected to an ideology that teaches them that they are inherently wrong—that they are unacceptable and unlovable as they are
because of something they cannot change. The purpose of SOCE is
to change one’s sexual orientation, and the majority of SOCE medical cases—if not all cases—involve LGBTQ+ youth. Regardless of
the desired sexual orientation, SOCE is considered a dangerous
medical treatment that does not produce results to refute its ineffectiveness, and ultimately, as shown above, states have the authority to prohibit such medical practices.
Our country is slow to change. Many states allow SOCE, while
other states have prohibited it. Many states allow same-sex couples
to adopt children, while other states do not. And just five years ago,
the LGBTQ+ community won a landmark case:
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies
the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and
family. In forming a marital union, two people become
something greater than once they were. As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a
love that may endure even past death. It would misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea
of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it
so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institutions.
They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.169
Our laws need to reflect our growing and diverse society, and it all
begins with our children. Our children deserve equal dignity in the
eyes of the law, and it is our responsibility to ensure they receive it.
After all, if we do not protect our children from harmful practices
like SOCE, then Justice Kennedy’s words regarding equality die on
the page, for those words can only live if we allow our children to
exist as they are.

169. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015) (emphasis added).

